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      he United States has consistently protested China’s maritime claims in 
the South China Sea. 
 
Background. The United States conveyed a letter to the United Nations 
Secretary General on June 1, 2020, rejecting China’s unlawful maritime 
claims in the South China Sea (SCS) as inconsistent with international law as 
reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).1 The letter responds to China’s Note Verbale No. CML/14/2019 
sent by the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to 
the Secretary General on December 12, 2019,2 objecting to Malaysia’s sub-
mission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), 
dated December 12, 2019, providing information on Malaysia’s extended 
continental shelf claim in the SCS.3  
 
China’s Note Verbale. China 
objected to Malaysia’s SCS sub-
mission indicating that Malaysia 
had seriously infringed on 
China’s sovereignty, sovereign 
rights, and jurisdiction in the 
SCS. Specifically, China asserted 
that it (1) has sovereignty over 
Nanhai Zhudao (SCS Islands), 
consisting of Dongsha Qundao 
(Pratas Islands), Xisha Qundao 
(Paracel Islands), Zhongsha 
Qundao (Macclesfield Bank) and 
Nansha Qundao (Spratly Is-
lands); (2) has internal waters, 
territorial sea and contiguous 
zone claims, based on Nanhai 
Zhudao; (3) has exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf 
claims, based on Nanhai Zhudao; and (4) has historic rights in the SCS. 
 
U.S. Protest. Heretofore, U.S. objections to China’s unlawful maritime 
claims have been limited to bilateral diplomatic exchanges. However, given 











with the international law of the sea as reflected in UNCLOS, and that those 
claims purport to unlawfully interfere with the rights and freedoms enjoyed 
by the United States and all other States in the SCS, the United States felt 
compelled to reiterate its formal protest of these unlawful assertions to the 
UN. The United States originally communicated its views on China’s unlaw-
ful SCS claims in a note verbale to the PRC on December 28, 2016, following 
the Tribunal’s award in The South China Sea Arbitration on July 12, 2016.4  
 
Historic Rights. The United States objects to China’s claim to “historic 
rights” in the SCS because it exceeds the maritime entitlements China could 
assert consistent with UNCLOS. China’s claim to “historic rights” in the 
SCS is not within the narrow category of historic claims recognized in UN-
CLOS (Articles 10 and 15). Numerous coastal States have EEZ and conti-
nental shelf entitlements in the SCS, and UNCLOS does not permit those 
entitlements to be overridden by another State’s maritime claims based on 
“history.” Moreover, even if the three-part legal test for “historic waters” 
were applicable, the nine-dashed-line (9DL) claim would fail each element 
of that test. The burden of establishing the existence of an historic title is on 
the claimant. A State must demonstrate (1) open, notorious, and effective 
exercise of authority over the body of water in question; (2) continuous ex-
ercise of that authority; and (3) acquiescence by foreign States in the exercise 
of that authority.5 China’s purported exercise of authority over the SCS has 
not been open, notorious, and effective. China’s purported exercise of au-
thority over the SCS has not been continuous given that there is widespread 
usage of the area by other claimants that is not consistent with Chinese sov-
ereignty or exclusive jurisdiction. Finally, no State has recognized the validity 
of China’s historic claim within the 9DL.6 
The U.S. position is consistent with the ruling of the Tribunal in The 
South China Sea Arbitration. The Tribunal concluded that UNCLOS compre-
hensively allocates rights to maritime areas, and that any historic rights China 
may have had to the resources in the SCS were extinguished by the EEZ 
provisions of the Convention. The Tribunal also found that there was no 
credible evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over 
the waters or resources of the SCS. Accordingly, the Tribunal decided that 
there was no legal basis for the PRC to claim historic rights to resources 













Straight Baselines. The United States objects to any claim of internal wa-
ters between the dispersed islands China claims in the SCS, and to any claim 
of maritime zones derived from treating the SCS island groups as a collective. 
UNCLOS is very clear—except as otherwise provided in the Convention, 
the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the various maritime zones 
is the low-water line.8 Circumstances under which coastal States can deviate 
from the normal baselines are extremely limited.9 None of these exceptions 
would allow China to enclose the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, Pratas Is-
lands, Macclesfield Bank, and Scarborough Reef within a system of straight 
or archipelagic baselines. 
China has created 28 base points and connected them to enclose the 
Paracel Islands. UNCLOS does not allow straight baselines to be drawn in 
this area. The proper baseline would be the low-water line of the individual 
land features. Additionally, China would not be allowed to draw archipelagic 
straight baselines around the Paracels since UNCLOS prohibits continental 
States like China from establishing archipelagic straight baselines around 
































Status of Land Features. The United States objects to any claimed mari-
time zones based on features that are not islands or rocks under Article 121. 
China may not assert sovereignty over, or claim maritime zones derived 
from, entirely submerged features like Macclesfield Bank or James Shoal, or 
features like Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal, which in their natural 
state are low-tide elevations (LTE) that lie beyond the 12-nm territorial sea 
of the mainland or an island/rock. Such features do not form part of the 
land territory of a State, are not subject to appropriation, and cannot generate 
a territorial sea or other maritime zones under UNCLOS. 
The U.S. position is consistent with the decision of the Tribunal in The 
South China Sea Arbitration. In evaluating whether certain reefs claimed by 
China were entitled to establish maritime zones, the Tribunal noted that fea-
tures are classified based on their “natural” (not man-made) condition.11 
Only “naturally” formed features that are above water at high tide are enti-
tled to claim at least a 12-nm territorial sea. LTEs that are submerged at high 
tide may not claim any maritime zones.12 Therefore, the fact that China has 
significantly modified these features to make them more “habitable” through 
extensive land reclamation and construction activities does not change the 
underlying character of the features, nor does it entitle these features to claim 
maritime zones that they would otherwise not be entitled to claim under the 
Convention.13 In other words, China cannot convert a LTE into a rock, or a 
rock into an island, by artificial enhancements to the features in order to 













Artificial islands built upon features that are submerged at high tide  











Restrictions on Navigational Freedoms. The United States objects to 
China’s vast maritime claims in the SCS that exceed the entitlements China 
could legally claim under UNCLOS and thereby purport to restrict the rights 
and freedoms, including navigational rights and freedoms, enjoyed by all 
States. In this regard, the United States also notes that the Philippines,14 Vi-
etnam,15 and Indonesia16 have independently conveyed their legal objections 
to China’s unlawful claims set out in China’s Note Verbale No. 
CML/14/2019. Accordingly, the United States again urges China to con-
form its maritime claims to UNCLOS; to comply with the Tribunal’s July 
12, 2016 decision, which is legally binding on China;17 and to cease its pro-
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